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ABSTRACT

The existing literature on sales teams explores various aspects of team members and their
effects on sales performance. The literature on sales management has described how managers
can promote better results from salespeople. The question at the intersection of these two streams
of literature – if managers should be part of sales teams -- has not been addressed and is what we
explore. Using data from a Fortune 1,000 firm that operates automotive service stores across the
US we test these effects. The data presents a natural experiment as sales teams with different
compositions are assigned randomly to the customers. We identify different configurations where
either the team is comprised only of salespeople or managers and salespeople. Based on insights
from game theory and agency theory, given there are more opportunities to free-ride in
salespeople-only teams, more shirking is expected in these teams, yielding less effort by all team
members, an outcome that would, in turn, result in lower sales. Our results show that the presence
of managers would reduce the shirking and increase sales.

KEYWORDS: Sales, Sales Managers, Sales teams, Agency Theory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In 2019, US firms spent approximately $7.2 billion to compensate over 65,000 managers in retail
contexts (BLS 2020). Managers recruit, train, coach, and evaluate employees and thus play a
vital supervisory role for firms (Schmitz and Ganesan 2014; Wieseke et al. 2009). Unlike many
types of managers, however, sales managers also take on a selling role whereby they’re tasked
with selling products and services to customers (Deeter-Schmelz, Goebel, and Kennedy 2008;
Hughes and Ogilvie 2019). In practice then, sales managers often take on dual roles of
supervising and selling (Rapp et al. 2020). Although having managers sell products and services
to customers may increase sales, doing so takes time away from their supervising responsibilities
which are also very important. Questions arise, therefore, as to how to balance these roles and
whether and when sales managers should engage in their selling role.
Unfortunately, practitioners provide conflicting advice on this issue. On the one hand, a
long-standing viewpoint is that managers should be managing, not selling (Loen 1964).
Perpetuating this view, recent advice suggests that, “as a manager, although you miss it, resist
the urge to jump in on the sale” (HubSpot 2020) and, “managers are responsible for making
operations run, not running them” (LinkedIn 2017b). On the other hand, some suggest that
“managers’ work is selling” (CareerBuilder 2020) and, “a managers’ job is to sell products”
(LinkedIn 2017a).
With a couple of notable exceptions (see Arnold et al. 2009; Rapp et al. 2020), academic
research provides little guidance on how to balance sales managers’ supervising and selling
roles. Although prior research examines sales managers, this research typically focusses on the
1

supervisory role of managers. For instance, prior work sheds important light on managers’
influence on teams (Ahearne et al. 2013; Atefi et al. 2018), managers’ leadership and
management styles (Mero, Guidice, and Werner 2012; Schmitz and Ganesan 2014), and
managers’ planning and execution (Deeter-Schmelz, Goebel, and Kennedy 2008; Grant 2003)
(see Table 1). The present research, therefore, complements prior research by incorporating sales
managers’ selling role and assessing whether and when sales managers should engage in this
role. Accordingly, we seek to make the following contributions to the literature on sales
managers.
First, to our knowledge, the present study is the first to explore the effects of sales
managers’ direct interactions with customers on transaction performance. As such, we
complement and extend the work by Arnold et al. (2009), who shine a light on how sales
managers influence sales by gauging how much time sales managers dedicate to selling. Our
work goes a step further and evaluates what happens when sales managers sell with their
salespeople. Thus, we take a more fine-grained view and how sales manager involvement
impacts the performance of individual transactions.
Second, given that sales managers also have to perform their supervisory role, it is
important to understand when sales managers should engage in their selling role (i.e., when to get
involved with individual transactions with customers). Recent research has begun to address this
issue. For instance, Rapp et al. (2020) find that allocating time to managing (supervising role)
yields higher performance with experienced sales units, i.e. salespeople working for the same
supervisor (Venkatesh, Challagalla, and Kohli 2001), while dedicating time to customer facing
activities (selling role) is a better choice for units with lower levels of experience. We build on
this important insight by examining sales teams, i.e. a group organized so that they operate
2

together (Holmstrom 1982), and by looking outside the characteristics of the sales units/teams
for guidance on how to allocate sales manager time. More specifically on the latter, we examine
customers’ relationship stage with the firm and product usage intensity and how these interact
with sales manager involvement in sales transactions. These two conditions are external to the
sales team, and unlike team composition, they can be more accessible for firms (Aakvik, Hansen,
and Torsvik 2017) to guide when managers can be most effective at maximizing sales
performance.
In this research, a customer’s relationship stage reflects whether they are a new or
returning customer (Dagger and Danaher 2014; Evans et al. 2000; Lemon and Verhoef 2016).
Product usage intensity is the extent to which a product has been used relative to how long the
product has been in use1 (Bolton and Lemon 1999; Challagalla, Venkatesh, and Kohli 2009;
Ram and Jung 1991). Our results indicate that sales teams with managers: (a) perform best with
new rather than returning customers, and (b) performance increases with product usage intensity.
To our knowledge, the present research is the first to blend insights from the literature on
customers’ relationship stage and product usage intensity and how they may impact the efficacy
of sales manager involvement in transactions. Thus, we provide an important first step in
understanding variables external to the team to inform sales managers on how to prioritize
getting involved in their sales teams’ transactions. Importantly, customer relationship stage and
usage intensity are relatively easy to distinguish across firms and industries. Thus, a broad range
firms may readily implement changes to their sales processes based on these variables.

1

This concept contrasts with the age of the product in the sense that a product can have low usage intensity even if it
was acquired a long time ago and vice versa (e.g., high usage intensity of a recent purchase). For example, a
washing machine acquired a three months ago that is used daily has higher usage intensity than a two-year old
washing machine that is used once a month.
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Third, prior research has not considered how sales manager involvement in (lower-level)
transactions with customers may affect higher, store-level outcomes in which managers’
supervisory role is most likely to manifest. Such an examination is important to understand
because if the benefit at the transaction-level comes at the expense of store-level performance,
then the necessity of managers having a selling role becomes questionable. The results of the
present study suggest that managers’ involvement in their sales teams’ customer transactions
increases transaction performance (i.e., the size of customers’ invoices); however, results also
suggest that manager involvement in sales teams’ transactions has an inverted u-shaped
relationship with store performance. This result implies that too little or too much manager
involvement in individual sales transactions can be detrimental to store performance. This
suggests a “sweet spot” of manager involvement in transactions that, to our knowledge, has not
been documented before. Taken together, our results provide evidence of novel and nuanced
effects of involving managers in their sales teams at both the transaction and store levels.
The results of the present research are based on analyzing a blend of two secondary
datasets, i.e., personnel and invoice datasets, from a longitudinal study with a Fortune 1000 firm
that operates nationwide automotive services in the US. The invoice dataset contains over 7
million invoices for more than 400 corporate operated stores located across the US. The
personnel dataset details characteristics of all the frontline staff of the company including rank,
age, gender, tenure, and promotion track. The partner firm’s selling setup consists of teams of
two salespeople per customer (one at the car window and one under the vehicle hood) that are
randomly paired by the store managers. Customers are randomly assigned to each sales team on
a first come first serve basis. Store managers walk around the store and can volitionally choose
to become part of any of the sales teams in the store. Given the random assignment of customers
4

to sales teams, of salespeople to the assigned teams, and sales managers choice to join sales
teams, the data from this firm provide a natural experiment setup. Using the blend of the
datasets, we are able to identify in each transaction whether the sales team had a sales manager
or not to test the effects of manager involvement on sales performance.
The current research uses longitudinal measures of both store (daily store revenue) and
transaction data (individual invoice revenue) to evaluate our contentions. The personnel dataset
also allows us to be able to include data about the team members such as age, tenure, and other
potential differences as controls to rule out potential competing explanations. These datasets
allowed us to apply big data management techniques and machine learning algorithms to take an
agnostic approach to the data and remove bias in the model selection and estimations, providing
more robustness to the findings. While the setup of the firm helps address some potential
endogeneity concerns, we also use state-of-the-art methods to address others. Our results provide
important managerial implications on if and when managers should get involved in the sales
teams.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we draw on insights from agency theory and
relevant streams of the management (e.g., teams and monitoring) and consumer behavior (e.g.,
information acquisition and processing) literatures to develop our hypotheses. We follow this
with a description of the firm and data setup used in the analysis. We then describe the models
and identification strategy before presenting our results. We conclude with managerial and
theoretical implications and some limitations of the research.

5

Table 1: Overview of the literature on sales teams and manager involvement

Article

Ahearne et al. (2013)

Arnold et al. (2009)

Atefi et al. (2018)

Auh et al. (2014)

Bunderson et al. (2015)

Manager
selling

No

No

No

No

No

Manager
supervising

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Customer Level of
data
analysis

Performance
moderators
(source)

Manager
attributes

Team
composition

Industry
(context)

Data
source

Duration

No

Sales team

Control systems
(internal)

Organizational
& interpersonal
identification

Non-managers

Non-descript
(B2B)

Survey /
records

One shot

Store

Supervisor &
goal-setting
activities
(internal)

Effort, planning,
leadership &
selling
orientation

Non-managers

Retail
(B2C)

Survey /
records

One shot

Store

Salesperson &
manager tenure
(internal)

Demographics
Tenure

Non-managers

Apparel
(B2C)

Field /
records

One shot

Sales team

Conflict
handling style
(internal)

-

Non-managers

CPG
(B2B)

Survey

One shot

Team

Task
complexity
(external)

-

Non-managers

Various
(B2B/B2C)

Survey

One shot

-

Students

Lab
(none)

Experimen
t

One shot

No

No

No

No

Chen and Lim (2017)

No

No

No

Sales team

Team
heterogeneity
(internal)

Deeter-Schmelz, Goebel, and
Kennedy (2008)

No

Yes

No

-

-

Values and
attributes

Managers &
non-managers

Non-descript
(none)

Survey

One shot

Frick, Prinz, and Winkelmann
(2003)

No

No

No

Team

-

-

Non-managers

Sports
(none)

Records

Longitudinal

-

Non-managers

Insurance
(B2C)

Field quasi
experiment

One shot

Garrett and Gopalakrishna
(2019)

No

No

No

Sales team

Impression
management
(internal)

Grant (2003)

No

Yes

No

Firm

-

-

Managers

Oil
(B2B)

Survey

One shot

Team

Power level
differences
(internal)

Power

Managers &
Non-managers

Finance
(none)

Video
recording

One shot

Greer and van Kleef (2010)

No

Yes

No
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Table 1 (continued)
Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and
van Praag (2013)

No

No

No

Sales team

Gender
(internal)

Huckman and Staats (2011)

No

No

No

Team

Task type
Team
familiarity
(internal)

Hughes and Ogilvie (2019)

No

Yes

No

-

-

No

Salesperso
n

Diversity
proportions
(internal)

Joshi, Liao, and Jackson (2006)

Lount et al. (2019)
Mero, Guidice, and Werner
(2012)

Rapp et al. (2020)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Team

Task visibility
(internal)

Students

Classroom
(none)

Experiment

One shot

-

Non-managers

Software
development
(B2B)

Survey /
records

One shot

Training focus

Non-managers

Non-descript
(none)

Survey

One shot

Non-managers

Equipment
and Supplies
(B2B)

Survey

One shot

-

Non-managers

Firefighters/
Lab
(none)

Survey /
lab

One shot

Construction
components
(B2B)

Survey /
records

One shot

-

Demographics

Team

-

Leadership style

Managers &
Non-managers

Sales team

Team
experience
(internal)

Time
allocations

Managers &
Non-managers

Hospitality
operators
(B2B)

Survey /
records

One shot

-

Non-managers

Industrial
glass
(B2B)

Survey

One shot

Schmitz (2013)

No

Yes

No

Sales team

Norm strength
Reputation
Ability
(internal)

Schmitz and Ganesan (2014)

No

Yes

No

Sales team

Self-efficacy
(internal)

Leadership style

Managers &
Non-managers

Pharma
(B2B)

Survey

One shot

-

Non-managers

Healthcare
(none)

Survey /
records

One shot

Wellman et al. (2019)

No

Yes

No

Team

Hierarchical
structure
(internal)

Wieseke et al. (2009)

No

Yes

No

Region or
Unit

Tenure
(internal)

Organizational
identification

Non-managers

Pharma
(B2B)

Survey /
records

One shot

Yes

Invoice &
Store

Customer type
Product stage
(external)

Involvement
Demographics
Tenure

Managers &
Nonmanagers

Automotive
(B2C)

Field /
records

Longitudinal

The present research

Yes

Yes
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

This study explores how a sales manager’s involvement in individual transactions
with his/her team members affects both transaction-level and store-level performance. In
general, we propose that manager involvement in individual transactions increases team
effort, i.e., “the amount of energy put into a behavior” (Mohr and Bitner 1995 p. 240).
Customers appreciate and value what they perceive as increased effort (Buell, Kim, and
Tsay 2016; Kirmani and Wright 1989), which manifests in greater customer satisfaction
(Crosby and Stephens 1987; Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann 2011) and increases
transaction-level performance (Christen, Iyer, and Soberman 2006; Fong and Tosi 2007).
In the following sections, we draw on agency theory (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992;
Eisenhardt 1989) to provide the theoretical foundations upon which managers involvement
in their sales teams impacts the effort of their teams.
Agency Theory
Enactment In almost every situation where two or more parties cooperate with each
other, one of the parties has more information about the transaction than the other party
(i.e., there is information asymmetry) (Akerlof 1970). Such information asymmetry in
principal-agent relationships can lead to moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Moral
hazard ensues when the agent possesses information that would benefit the principal, but
the former does not share or misrepresents the information to the latter (Pauly 1968). A
common example of moral hazard in sales is when salespeople knowingly exert less effort
than they are capable of, i.e., shirking. The principals (firms) want to get as much output
1

(sales) while using the smallest quantity of resources (e.g., salaries, supervision, contracts,
etc.). The agents (salespeople) want to get as much output (compensation) while using the
least number of resources (e.g., effort, time, attention, etc.). If salespeople put more energy
into the transaction, customers react positively to that, which results in higher sales
(Román and Iacobucci 2010; Surprenant and Solomon 1987). This is the objective of the
firm (principal), but the amount of effort salespeople are genuinely capable of is only
known to them (agents), leaving room for moral hazard. Assuming that both parties in a
principal-agent relationship are utility maximizers, the game theory prediction is that both
parties will act selfishly. It follows that agents will shirk unless principals have forms to
prevent them from doing so.
When Hölmstrom (1979) explored how moral hazard arose in principal-agent
relationships as a consequence of information asymmetry, he showed that the presence of
an intermediate agent on behalf of the principal – a supervisor – would reduce moral
hazard. This formalized what Stiglitz (1975) had proposed and later became known in
agency theory as monitoring. Formally, this type of monitoring – supervision – is the idea
that an agent (sales manager) that has objectives more closely aligned to those of the
principal (Ouchi 1979) can act on behalf of the principal (firm) with other agents
(salespeople), and that the presence of the former agent (sales manager) makes the latter
agents (salespeople) exert more effort. This is the supervisory role of managers, as agents
acting on behalf of the principals, that has had attention in sales management research.
The literature has shown that without proper supervision, agent effort is not
observable to the principals, thereby increasing the likelihood of shirking (Jones 1984;
Stathakopoulos 1996). With supervision, the observability of effort is increased
2

(Eisenhardt 1985), which lowers the likelihood of shirking. In a store, for example, when
sales managers are walking around the sales floor, without necessarily engaging with the
customers and getting involved with selling, their mere presence is likely to increase the
effort from salespeople (Deeter-Schmelz, Goebel, and Kennedy 2008; Rich 1997). This is
the most basic form of supervising to improve sales performance: salespeople shirk less
when managers are present, even if they are not involved in the sales process themselves.
Sales Teams
There is an additional layer of complexity when sales are being done by teams.
When two or more agents with the same job (peers) are on a team, agents can free ride on
the effort of each other, especially if all that can be observed is the output of the team
(Holmstrom 1982). In a team with several utility-maximizing agents, each one is trying to
maximize his/her benefits (compensation) while minimizing his/her costs (effort).
In teams with a collective output the game-theoretic prediction would be similar to
a prisoners’ dilemma (Rapoport, Chammah, and Orwant 1965), which means that all sales
team members will try to maximize their utility by providing the least amount of effort and
counting on the other agents to carry the weight (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997). The
outcome is that all agents shirk as much as possible as long as the job gets done and they
are not caught shirking by their supervisor (Baldwin and Clark 2006). This implies that
performance will be suboptimal since the sales agents in the team will not exert their full
effort. If managers can monitor (via their supervisory role) individual agent performance in
a team (even with team output) shirking is reduced (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jones
1984). The expectation is that a team of salespeople with no supervision will shirk the

3

most, while a sales team that is being supervised by a manager will exert a higher level of
effort than that baseline.2
Unfortunately, the literature does not inform what to expect when managers engage
their selling role and participate in sales transactions with their teams. Recent work on the
conditions for equilibria in agent-principal contexts with multiple agents may provide
some guidance. For instance, research suggests that heterogeneity among agents increases
effort from all agents (Kaya and Vereshchagina 2015). One way team heterogeneity
increases team effort is through perceptions of task visibility. Research on task visibility
shows that when individuals perceive that others can evaluate their individual effort
(increased task visibility), they become more concerned with exerting more effort (Harkins
and Szymanski 1989). This generally results in all team members exerting more effort to a
level higher than they do working alone (Lount and Wilk 2014). Differences in hierarchy
among team members increase this effect, as those lower in the hierarchy are more
concerned with how their effort will be perceived by those higher in hierarchy (Lount et al.
2019). In practice, this means that a team where members have different jobs has increased
task visibility for members, which increases the effort of the whole team. This effect is
even stronger when one of the team members is higher in the hierarchy. Therefore, in a
sales team with managers there is increased task visibility for salespeople and differences
in hierarchy, and both increase effort from sales agents. The resulting effort is higher than
that of working alone, with other salespeople, and even higher than the effort driven by

2

These predictions do not hold when individual incentives are present. The retail setting we evaluate, and
many other sales contexts, however, do not offer individual incentives for salespeople.

4

mere supervision by the sales manager, leading to better sales performance. In summary,
sales teams with managers are likely to have increased performance.
It could be argued, however, that in this setup sales managers are also agents, and
as such, they are prone and susceptible to the same free-riding and shirking woes as
salespeople. If sales managers in sales teams act like salespeople would, then sales
managers could also hide their true effort and free ride on their salespeople’s effort. This
could result in the total effort of a sales team with a manager being equal or lower than a
sales team without a manager. Although this scenario is plausible, extant research suggests
it is unlikely. Promotion is one of the ways that firms incentivize good performance
(Fairburn and Malcomson 1994), which results in a large number of sales managers having
been salespeople who were promoted from within their organizations (Armstrong,
Pecotich, and Mills 1993). But these folks were not promoted to managers only because
they were good performers, but also because they “display a high internal commitment to
the firm’s objectives” (Ouchi 1979, p. 837) and they are “people whose preferences
coincide with those of management” (Eisenhardt 1985, p. 148). These characteristics of
sales managers imply that as sales team members they would be more likely to exert effort
closer to their true effort even without supervision (Anderson and Oliver 1987). These
characteristics of sales managers and the intuition about salespeople in teams with
managers would result in higher sales for teams with managers than teams without
managers.
Given the expectation that sales teams with managers would exhibit increased
performance, the intuition for firms would be to increase the amount of time sales
managers spend selling. Exploring the tradeoffs needed to deal with the dual roles of sales
5

management (Rapp et al. 2020) leads inevitably to consider under which conditions sales
manager involvement with their sales teams is maximized. We identify two such
conditions in the next section.
Contingencies: Customer and Product Stages
With a limited number of managers that can be part of sales teams, maximization of
resources is crucial. How should stores prioritize which transactions their managers should
engage in with their sales teams? Allocation of managers should be done so that managers
get involved in teams where the increased effort the sales team will exert produces the
greatest sales. We identify two variables external to the team that can help in this regard:
customers’ relationship stage with the firm and product usage intensity.
Customers’ relationship stage with the firm. Customers’ relationship stages are
defined as “the major transitions on how parties [sellers and buyers] regard each other”
(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987 , p. 15). It is widely known and acknowledged that
customers’ interactions with firms are different at different stages (Reinartz, Krafft, and
Hoyer 2004; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). In particular, when it comes to the
distinction between new and returning customers, Anderson and Simester (2004 p. 13)
propose that, “we would expect the first-time customers, who had almost no other
information with which to form expectations, to be more sensitive to any learning effects.”
Initial impressions, values, or perspectives shape the judgment of the shopping experience
(Epley and Gilovich 2006). Without prior experiences, new customers are more likely to
be influenced than returning customers (Kaustia, Alho, and Puttonen 2008). These ideas
suggest that new customers are likely to react to sales efforts more so than returning
customers.
6

Alternatively, as customers interact more and more with a firm, they become less
likely to change their perceptions of the firm (List 2011). As people gain more information
about a firm, their perceptions become more firmly ingrained over time which makes them
less sensitive to new information (Boulding, Kalra, and Staelin 1999; Hogarth and Einhorn
1992). As Dagger and Danaher (2014, p. 65) note, “[p]rior knowledge heavily influences
purchase decisions and can make new information less impactful. That is, the more
experienced a customer is with a particular store, the less impactful changes will be on
their purchase decisions over time.” In sum, therefore, effort by the sales team is likely to
be more impactful with new customers who are still acquiring information and more
susceptible to new information. If teams where managers are embedded are more likely to
exert more effort than teams without managers, these ideas can be formalized as:
Hypothesis 1: A team with a sales manager in it will have higher sales with new
customers than with returning customers relative to a team without a sales manager in it.
Product usage intensity. Product usage intensity refers to how much a product has
been used relative to how long the product has been in use (Bolton and Lemon 1999;
Challagalla, Venkatesh, and Kohli 2009; Ram and Jung 1991). For example, a 2-year-old
car with 50,000 miles has high usage intensity, while a 10-year-old car with the same
mileage has low usage intensity. Research on product usage provides a framework on how
reactions to sales effort would differ across product usage intensity.
With low usage intensity, customers are more susceptible to outside information
(Cameron and Englin 1997) and customers who purchase lightly used products are more
likely to provide good care to them (Brough and Isaac 2012). This suggests that users of
products with low usage intensity are more sensitive to the effort exerted by sales teams.
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The expectation would be different for median usage intensity. At the median usage
intensity, users choose options with lower costs than users with low usage intensity (Nunes
2000) and they believe it would not be “fair” to pay extra (Einhorn 1994; Yang and
Peterson 2004). These notions imply users of products with median usage intensity are less
susceptible to sales efforts.
On the other extreme, users of products with high usage intensity tend to be more
knowledgeable about product features, benefits, and issues (Jewell and Unnava 2004;
Johnson and Russo 1984). The products with high usage intensity also need more
maintenance and their users stand to lose more if they break down (Challagalla, Venkatesh,
and Kohli 2009). These conditions imply that customers with high usage intensity products
will be more receptive to sales efforts of sales teams. Given these conditions around usage
intensity and the expectation that teams with managers exert more effort, the relationship
between product usage intensity and manager involvement in sales teams can be framed as:
Hypothesis 2: A team with a manager in it will have higher sales relative to a team
without managers for low and high usage intensity, but not at the median usage intensity,
following a convex function, i.e. a U-shape.
Even if the sales managers joining the sales teams affects performance, there is a
tradeoff to be made about whether they get involved in sales transactions. Although
manager involvement is likely to benefit transaction performance Rapp et al. (2020 p. 144)
also suggest that another benefit of manager involvement in transactions is that it
“provide[s] direction for managers to prioritize activities that maximize team potential.” In
other words, when managers are not involved with their sales teams, they are missing out
on opportunities to learn how to prioritize their time, chances to train and coach, and
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failing to promote effort in sales teams. On the other hand, sales managers’ supervisory
duties – e.g. leadership (Deeter-Schmelz, Goebel, and Kennedy 2008), monitoring
performance (Boichuk et al. 2019), fostering well-being (Kemp, Leila Borders, and Ricks
2013), and hiring (Marshall, Goebel, and Moncrief 2003) – are crucial for store
performance (Hughes and Ogilvie 2019), but when managers are involved in too many
sales transactions, they spend less time performing these duties, which would likely not
impact the individual transactions immediately, but rather be observed at the store level.
The adequate level of trade-off between selling and supervising would have all the
benefits from managers’ selling, without the negative consequences of neglecting
supervisory duties. This relationship suggests there is a manager involvement “sweet spot”.
Focusing on store sales instead of the individual transactions would capture the higherorder consequences of managers involvement in sales and allow for identification of said
sweet spot. Using the percentage of transactions that have sales managers as a measure of
manager involvement in selling, the previous notions can be formally expressed as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between manager involvement in sales and store
performance follows a concave function, i.e. an inverted U-shape.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
To test our proposed hypotheses, we use data from a firm in the automotive
maintenance and repair industry. The partner firm is a Fortune 1000 company whose
automotive service division operates over 400 stores nationwide and manages a similar
number of stores as franchisees. We use the data only from the corporate-owned stores to
reduce the variation and unobserved heterogeneity that could come from including the
franchises.
Prior to data collection, we had several meetings with the firm’s management team
and visited several locations (both with and without company management). These
meetings and visits solidified for us the sales process and the sales team and customer
assignment procedures (which we subsequently refer to in our discussion of endogeneity).
Once we had a good understanding of these issues, we collected sales data at the
transaction level for all the company-owned stores across the country from 2016-2019. We
decided to use the fiscal year 2017-2018 for the analysis,3 which gave us over 7 million
transactions for our sample. We cleaned the dataset using the data handling libraries in
Python (Van Rossum and Drake 2011). With a median ticket size of $62.99 per sale, sales
that were above the 99th percentile (tickets over $233) were excluded from the analyses as
they are likely special orders and services that are not frequent, and as such not

3

We ran the estimations with the other fiscal years and found analogous results, with similar magnitudes,
directions, and significance.
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representative of the normal sales process. Our selection process also left out transactions
that did not include the standard vehicle maintenance service offered by the firm, as those
transactions are also not representative of the normal sales process. The analyses presented
in the results section use the rest of the data, which is a little over 6 million independent
observations grouped across 462 stores.
Generalizability
The findings of our analyses are informative and likely to be transferable to a large
number of sales settings. Contributing to this ecological validity are the general attributes
of the automotive services industry. The services provided by an automotive maintenance
and repair provider are specialized, but not unique, just like many other settings.
Appropriate training is required to provide vehicle maintenance and repair successfully.
This training generally does not require a high degree of expert knowledge. In other words,
although it is not just anybody who can provide high quality maintenance and repair for a
vehicle, acquiring the expertise is not so difficult that only a selected few would be able to
provide the service. Similar training and specialization requirements are common to other
industries.
The economics of the automotive services and repair market also contribute to the
generalizability of the findings. The vehicle maintenance and repair market is not highly
concentrated, and there is ample competition in the market. The absence of an oligopoly
with distorted demand and supply functions, is shared across most industries. The vehicle
maintenance and repair market is a high-frequency market. Most vehicles require regular
maintenance around every 5,000 miles, which results in a car shop visit every three to four

11

months, according to the average mileage data of the US Department of Transportation
(USDOT 2018). High-frequency products and services sales settings are abundant.
The specific sales format at the partner firm is another aspect that contributes to the
generalizability of the findings. In a vehicle maintenance and repair store from this firm
(and most of their competitors), sales are based on a standard basic service that can be
upsold with replacement of parts and/or additional services. Successful sales teams will be
able to upsell to customers who come to the store with the basic service in mind. This
upsell of a basic product or service setup not only produces an interesting variance in the
size of the sales ticket, but it is also popular in other sales contexts. Sales in the automotive
service industry rely heavily on repeat purchases for the cash flow from operating
activities. As such, loyalty plays an important role in the revenue stream, a characteristic of
sales in many other industries. The incentive structure of the partner firm does not have
any bonuses or commissions for salespeople, which is also a common feature to other sales
settings. Finally, the firm partner firm operates all across the US, which contributes to
generalizability across geographic and demographic lines.
Sales Process Setup
To better understand how the variables used in the analyses were operationalized, a
description of the sales process is highly informative. At any of the stores for this
automotive service firm customers drive to the store and are greeted by a staff member
who directs them to the next available service bay. The assignment of the customer to a
service bay follows a first-come-first-serve queue. In this firm, the store managers decide
how many people they will assign to each service bay based on the average load of the
stores and the number of team members available.
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Each service bay has three positions where staff perform different duties. Below the
service bay one employee is servicing the parts that are accessible only through the bottom
of the vehicle – we call this person the bottom. In front of the car a second employee is
servicing the parts that can be accessed through the hood – we call this team member the
top. A third employee is talking with the customer, who remains in the car as it is being
serviced, we call this person the customer service representative - csr. The bottom working
underneath the car has no contact with the customer. The top working under the hood and
the csr at the window with the customer are the ones who do most of the customer
interaction, describing what the service will entail and doing most of the upsell/crossselling efforts. With this setup, although three people comprise the full service-bay team,
the sales team boundaries are more accurately defined when including only the two
customer-facing employees (top and csr) as the sales team, since they are the ones doing
the sales efforts.
Endogeneity Concerns
Addressing potential sources of endogeneity is important for the internal validity of
the analysis (Papies, Ebbes, and Van Heerde 2017). The most important source of
endogeneity in the result would come from self-selection of teams to customers with either
higher sales potential or with easier sales. The random assignment of customers to service
bays on a first-come first-serve basis rules out this selection bias as a potential explanation
of the results and the endogeneity of sales team on sales potential or sales effort. Sales
teams cannot know a priori if the customer that is driving into their assigned bay will be an
easy sell or has a high potential, nor can the team change bays or switch the customer to a
different bay. Furthermore, the incentive structure that the firm uses would also help rule
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out self-selection of managers into sales teams to maximize sales. Salespeople at the firm
have a 100% salary compensation, no commission on sales. Sales managers, meanwhile,
have an incentive as part of their pay. This incentive, however, is based on the total
amount of customers that they service in a month, not on the amount of sales or sales per
customer. If anything, such an incentive structure would be more likely to motivate sales
managers to increase the speed at which customers are serviced, which would be contrary
to joining sales teams to increase the sales per ticket.
Another concern about endogeneity in the results could come from the assignment
of store managers to bays by staff needs. Under company policy, managers are asked to
avoid getting involved as part of the sales team as a result of a shortage of staff, ruling out
the possibility of manager involvement in sales based on staffing needs. We test the effect
of staffing on manager involvement by regressing the number of sales transactions with
managers on monthly staffing and find no statistically significant effect of staffing on
manager involvement.
Nevertheless, managers can volitionally decide to be a part of the sales teams in
any of the three roles if they choose to, which they may do for a number of reasons.
Managers may choose to become part of a team to give a team member a break, to train a
new employee, or simply to stay busy (some of them admit they miss it).
From this volitional assignment of managers to bays, however, another source of
endogeneity may arise. It could be argued that there is a self-selection of managers into
bays with easier sales or at least higher potential sales (e.g., with luxury cars). The service
bays are equipped with computers to track customer data and provide guidance to the staff
at the bay. The staff assigned to each bay has to log in to these computers when they are
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assigned to the bay and log out when they are going on breaks or ending their shifts. With
this setup, although it not likely, it cannot be ruled out that a manager would decide to step
into a team and log in to the service bay computer if they feel like they could maximize the
sale. The company policies would not help address this concern.
We address this concern with a statistical approach by comparing the proportions
of each team configuration across car brands. Luxury brands that could potentially be
identified as having more sales potential (van Heerde, Srinivasan, and Dekimpe 2010). If
the likelihood of managers selling is not statistically different for luxury versus non-luxury
brands, the effects on sales could not be attributed to sales manager self-selection into
teams with greater potential. Using a Kruskal-Wallis H-test (Kruskal and Wallis 1952) – a
multi-category generalization of the Mann-Whitney (Mann and Whitney 1947) stochastic
dominance test – we compare the proportions of transactions with and without managers
for 4 different4 brands (two luxury and two non-luxury) can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Different manager involvement configurations by brand
Car Brand
Configuration
LuxA
LuxB NoLuxA NoLuxB
No manager
73.7%
75.0%
75.2%
75.5%
With manager
24.6%
23.4%
23.1%
22.9%

The proportions of with- and without-manager teams are not statistically different
across car brands. Given this result, the concern about self-selection of managers into
higher sales potential transactions is alleviated.

4

The tests were done with other subsets of brands and the results were similar in magnitude and significance.
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Model Specification and Identification
As described in the data section, the stores have two customer-facing positions, the
top and the csr. Although it is feasible that the same person performs both functions (csr
and top), this is a rather rare occurrence for transactions that require the basic service and
the transactions that do meet this criterion are excluded of the analyses. As managers walk
around the store, they can decide to become a part of a sales team in the store by taking on
either of those two roles in a bay. The sales team can then have one of four different
configurations: (1) top and csr are not managers (team with no managers), a mix where
either (2) top is a manager but csr is not a manager or (3) top is not a manager but csr is a
manager (team with a manager), and finally (4) a setup where both top and csr are
managers (team with only managers). The last case is a rare occurrence (less than 2% of
the data) and as such we do not include it in the analysis.
The first set of hypothesized effects occur at the individual transaction level. To
gain insight about what manager selling does to the sales ticket sizes each transaction in
the data is coded to reflect the three possible sales team configurations. Any customerfacing role being done by a manager is coded as 1 (0 otherwise) for each transaction. This
coding is used to create a qualitative variable for managers involved as part of sales teams
(Invol) that takes three values: one for teams with no managers (0,0), a second value for
teams with a manager as top (1,0), and a third value for teams with a manager as csr (0,1).
Almost three quarters of the transactions in the data (74.8%) fall in the manager team
category. Less than a quarter (23.5%) of the sales in the data have one manager, with the
remaining of the transactions (1.7%) being tended by teams of only managers (which were
excluded from the analyses). The initial model measuring managers as part of sales teams
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at the transaction level regresses individual ticket value in USD of each transaction (Sales)
on the different levels of manager involvement for the invoice (Invol), and is stated
formally as:

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙 + 𝜆 + 𝛿 + 𝜓 + 𝜃 𝐶𝑠𝑟 + 𝛤 𝑇𝑜𝑝 + 𝜖

Eq. 1

If there is an effect of managers selling on sales outcomes, competing explanations
of the results could either be that managers are more experienced and/or that asymmetry of
genders and/or ages could bring biases in the results. Therefore, the specification of this
model uses vectors of employee data to control for tenure, age, race, education level, and
gender of the csr (θ) and the top (Γ). By controlling for these variables, the model aims to
isolate the effects of sales managers being part of the sales teams on the individual
transactions.
Given that each store is likely to have different clientele, geographic conditions,
regional cultural differences, weather, etc., it is a safe assumption that there would be
differences between stores and regions that could confound the effects of manager
involvement on sales. We use the store identifiers for an estimation of panel models with
fixed effects (𝛿) for each store. Another potential source of bias is self-selection of
managers into the sales teams due to the staffing of the stores. To account for this, the
monthly level of staffing per store is included (𝜆). Finally, to account for potential
seasonality differences, indicators (𝜓) for the different seasons (spring, summer, autumn,
and winter) are also included.
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It is also logical to assume that not all customers will react to sales efforts of sales
teams the same way. These unobserved idiosyncratic differences between customers result
in unobserved variation of sales being different across customers, which in statistical
terms, implies that the error term in the model is unlikely to be homoscedastic. To account
for heteroskedasticity, the model uses clustered robust standard errors (𝜖), using the stores
as cluster units, as the customers of each store are more likely to have correlated
unobserved variation.
As it was discussed in the theoretical context section, boundary conditions to how
manager selling activities maximize returns are crucial to provide guidance for firms on
how to allocate sales managers’ time. We use some of the customer information in the data
to evaluate the hypothesized moderators. The first moderator assessed in this research is
customer stage. Following the firm’s policies, a customer is considered new when they
either do not have a history with the firm at all or when they have not had a visit to any
store in two years or more. This setup allows us to create a qualitative variable (New) to
indicate the customer type, where 1 identifies a new customer (0 otherwise). These
identifiers are included as interactions in the initial sales model to measure the effects of
sales managers being part of sales teams on sales performance conditional on being a new
(returning) customer.
The other boundary condition evaluated is the product usage intensity. To obtain
the product usage intensity for each transaction, the mileage and model-year of each
vehicle serviced are used. For every model-year in the dataset the mileage is split into five
quantiles. The quantile category for the vehicle in each transaction is used to classify them
as low product usage (first quantile), high product usage (last quantile), or median product
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usage (median quantile). These identifiers of product usage are used to construct the threelevel qualitative variable (Usage) included in interactions in the initial sales model. This
model measures the effects of different sales team configurations on sales conditional on
each product usage level. The model is specified as:

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙 + Λ 𝑁𝑒𝑤 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙 + Φ 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙 + 𝜆 + 𝛿 + 𝜓

Eq. 2

+ 𝜃 𝐶𝑠𝑟 + 𝛤 𝑇𝑜𝑝 + 𝜖

To evaluate the stores’ implications of managers selling, measures at the store level
are necessary. To obtain a store sales variable (Daily), we simply sum all the sales in a
store per day. For a store level measure of manager selling activity, the process is slightly
more involved. We use the proportion of daily sales where managers are involved as
customer facing team members. We first sum the count of managers involved across all the
sales of a store per day. We then divide this sum by the total number of invoices per store
per day to construct a daily store level measure of manager sales involvement (StoreMI).
This store manager sales involvement measure represents the percentage of the daily sales
in a store that has managers involved in sales, regardless of what customer-facing role they
are performing, top, or csr.
The store level variables allow for a data driven exploration of the relationship
between the sales of a store and manager involvement in sales. The choice of model
provides the opportunity to find what the relationship is more likely to look like. For
example, choosing a linear model would be assuming that the relationship between
manager involvement and store sales is monotonically increasing, implying that more
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manager involvement would unequivocally result in higher sales. Choosing a log-linear
model, on the other hand, would assume some form of exponential growth, which could
imply that the as manager involvement increases, sales multiply exponentially.
Our theoretical discussion suggests that there might be a “sweet spot” of manager
involvement in sales that produces optimal store sales results, where either too little or too
much manager selling would be detrimental to sales. To find out if that is the case, a series
of fractional polynomial models (Royston and Altman 1994) using the store level variables
are estimated. Using different polynomial expressions of the manager involvement in sales
in a model of daily store sales would guide a better understanding of the nature of the
relationship between manager involvement in sales teams and sales. Furthermore, using
fractional polynomials instead of a traditional linear or a simple polynomial approach,
delivers more flexibility in the model fit. The models used in the analyses are therefore
linear in parameters but polynomial on StoreMI, following the subsequent specification:

𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑀𝐼 𝑝1 + 𝛼2 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑀𝐼 𝑝2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑘 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑀𝐼 𝑝𝑘 + 𝜆 + 𝛿

Eq. 3

+𝜓+ 𝜖

This store sales model includes the store fixed effects, staffing, seasonality, and
clustered robust standard errors that were included in the transaction level models.
Following the instructions of Royston and Sauerbrei (2008) to use the same power multiple
times in the model without collinearity, when the model uses a term k times, it multiplies
each term with the same power by the natural logarithm of the independent variable to a
power of k-1. For example, if a cubic term of the StoreMI is used three times, k=3, the first
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cubic term, k-1=0, of StoreMI is included without multiplying it by the natural logarithm,
e.g. StoreMI3. The second cubic term, k-1=1, is constructed by multiplying StoreMI cubed
times the natural log of StoreMI, e.g. StoreMI3 * ln(StoreMI). The third term, k-1=2, is
built with StoreMI cubed times the square of the natural log of StoreMI, e.g. StoreMI3 *
ln(StoreMI)2.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Manager Involvement Effects on Sales Transactions
A linear model with indicator variables for the different team configurations and
control variables (Equation 1) is used to explore the effects on sales of having managers
involved in the sales process relative to teams without managers. The estimation used the
team with no manager as the baseline category. The results of the estimation are in the first
column of Table 3. Most of the employee characteristics that were included as control
variables were not statistically significant. The ones that are statistically significant are the
age of the csr and top and having a college education for csr and top. These results
indicate, unsurprisingly, that regardless of rank and role, older customer facing employees
and employees with a college education sell more. These results rule out potential
alternative explanations of the results, such as the level of experience (reflected by the
tenure of the employees). The seasonality indicator variables are negative, indicating that
sales are lower in all seasons relative to spring. The level of staffing of the stores impacts
sales negatively, but as mentioned earlier the number of invoices with managers is not
impacted by how staffed the stores are, ruling out a self-selection of managers into
transactions when stores are not fully staffed.
As for the effect of sales managers getting involved in sales transactions while
controlling for other factors, this is captured by the estimated parameter in the first row of
the first column of Table 3. This estimate indicates that a team with a manager has a
positive and statistically significant effect on sales relative to the no-manager baseline. The
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interpretation of this result is easier when looking at the marginal effects of the different
configurations, i.e., the forecasted sales for teams with and without managers. The
estimated marginal effects are in Table 4 with the first three rows of the first column show
the estimates for each sales team configuration. The sales teams without mangers have
lower sales ($69.29) than teams where at least one of the customer-facing jobs is being
done by a manager ($71.99 and $74.00), a statistically significant difference (p < 0.01),
providing support for hypothesis 1.
Although teams with managers have better performance than teams without
managers, the difference in sales between teams where the sales manager performs one
role or the other needs to be addressed. In the empirical context where we test our
hypotheses sales teams with managers can have managers in any of the customer facing
positions (csr or top). One potential explanation would be that since sales managers in this
setting are often salespeople that were promoted, they are better skilled at selling,
suggesting that teams with managers having more customer facing time would perform
better (manager as csr). This is not the result we find but rather the opposite.
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Table 3: Fixed-effects panel regressions of sales with different manager involvement
configurations, customer stage, and product relationship stages
Variable
Base model
With moderators
Team w/manager
2.29*
(0.18)
2.31*
(0.18)
New customer
-1.99* (0.09)
New w/manager
0.22*
(0.09)
Low usage
-0.91*
(0.11)
Low w/manager
-0.19
(0.13)
High usage
3.17*
(0.13)
High w/manager
0.22
(0.14)
Tenure Csr
-2.75e04 (7.17e04)
-4.01e04 (7.63e04)
Tenure Top
4.86e03 (6.16e03)
4.74e03 (6.07e03)
Age Csr
0.10*
(0.01)
0.10*
(0.01)
Age Top
0.02*
(0.00)
0.02*
(0.00)
Female Csr
0.08
(0.19)
0.07
(0.19)
Female Top
-0.13
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.09)
Race Csr
Black
0.13
(0.25)
0.12
(0.25)
Latino
-0.21
(0.40)
-0.22
(0.40)
Other race
0.24
(0.67)
0.25
(0.67)
Race Top
Black
-0.51
(0.79)
-0.52
(0.79)
Latino
0.01
(0.11)
0.01
(0.11)
Other race
0.46
(0.18)
0.45
(0.18)
Education Csr
Trade/Tech
0.12
(0.49)
0.11
(0.49)
College
0.78* (0.19)
0.78*
(0.19)
Education Top
Trade/Tech
0.08
(0.18)
0.07
(0.18)
College
0.19* (0.06)
0.19*
(0.06)
Store staffing
-0.88* (0.32)
-0.95*
(0.32)
Season
Summer
-0.19* (0.09)
-0.28*
(0.10)
Fall
-0.72* (0.10)
-0.66*
(0.10)
Winter
-1.05* (0.10)
-0.97*
(0.10)
Intercept
66.07* (0.41)
66.08*
(0.41)
Sample size
6,029,514
6,029,514
Log-likelihood
-29,359,060
-29,351,901
AIC
58,718,175
58,703,875
BIC
58,718,542
58,704,378
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% is denoted by *.
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Furthermore, in teams where managers are doing most of the customer facing (csr
position), it could also be argued that managers’ status could be influencing customers in
the transactions. If customers know that they are being serviced by a manager some status
effects (Hu and Van den Bulte 2014) could increase the size of the sales ticket. This can be
ruled out because the staff at the store cannot be identified by rank without prior
knowledge. The staff wears are identical uniforms regardless of rank and while each team
member has a name tag, this tag has no indication of the rank. These conditions suggest
neither status effects nor manager sales expertise would be driving the increase in sales
relative to the no-manager teams.
Table 4: Marginal effects sales with different manager involvement configurations,
customer types, and product life cycle stages

Condition

Base model

Involvement
No manager

69.29 (0.03)

With manager
1,0
0,1

By Customer Stage

By Product Stage

71.99 (0.17)
74.00 (0.13)

New
New no manager
New w/manager
Ret. no manager
Ret. w/manager
Usage intensity

67.50
69.99
70.99
72.34

Low no manager
Low w/manager
Median no manager
Median w/manager
High no manager
High w/manager

(0.08)
(0.17)
(0.05)
(0.14)
67.51
70.15
68.49
71.35
71.69
74.88

Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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(0.12)
(0.15)
(0.07)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.15)

The difference between team configurations with managers can be explained with
the specific setup of the firm. As mentioned in the methodology section, every service bay
is equipped with a computer terminal where the transactions are registered, and sales teams
log in to identify themselves as the team in charge of each transaction. The computer
terminals also provide guidance to the csr on which services can be upsold/cross-sold
based on the manufacturer’s recommendations, usage, previous visits (for returning
customers), etc. Given sales managers are incentivized to maximize the number of
customers they service per month, sales managers in the csr position could be less likely to
follow the recommendations if that would slow down the sale. Meanwhile, salespeople
who are csr will exert effort to upsell and cross-sell the recommendations with their sales
manager watching at the top position. More research would be needed to pinpoint precisely
if this is the case.
Manager Involvement and Customer Stage
We proposed earlier that the effect of manager involvement on sales could be
different for new and returning customers. The second columns of table 3 show the results
of the estimation of a model where the effects of manager involvement on sales conditional
on the moderators are calculated (Equation 2). The parameter estimate for the new customer
indicator is negative, which implies that new customers have lower sales than returning
customers. The parameter estimates for the interactions between manger involvement and
customer stage is positive and statistically significant, which means that manager
involvement increases the ticket size for both customers stages, but the effect is stronger for
new customers.
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Once again, the marginal effects can be of help for better understanding of this
relationship. The middle columns of Table 4 show the predicted sales for each
configuration. Just like in the unconditional estimation, manager involvement in sales
transactions yields higher sales for both customer stages, but the effect is stronger for new
customers than for returning customers. This relationship between manager involvement
with customer stage is better illustrated graphically (Figure 1).
4.00%
3.75%

% Sales Increase

3.50%
3.25%
3.00%
2.75%
2.50%
2.25%
2.00%
1.75%
1.50%
New

Recurring

Figure 1: Increases in Sales by Team Configuration for New and Returning Customers

The graph in Figure 1 illustrates that although a sales team with a manager
performs better than a team with no managers with a returning customer, the effect is
stronger for new customers (3.7% vs. 1.9%, p < 0.01). The difference for these increases in
sales is statistically significant, a result that supports hypothesis 2, indicating managers are
more effective in increasing sales ticket size for new customers than for returning
customers.
Manager Involvement and Product Usage
Another condition we proposed that would maximize the benefits of manager
involvement in sales is the product stage. The last columns of table 3 have the results of
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the estimation of the effects of manager involvement conditional on product stage. The
parameter estimate for low usage intensity is negative and statistically significant, which
means that customers with low usage intensity vehicles have lower sales that vehicles with
median product usage. The parameter estimate for vehicles with high usage intensity is
positive and statistically significant, indicating that sales for customers with these vehicles
are higher than sales for customers with vehicles at the median usage. The parameter
estimates of the interactions are not statistically significant, meaning that the differences in
sales by usage intensity is not coming from the involvement of managers in the sales
transaction.
For a better grasp what happens with sales manager involvement across usage
intensity, let us take look at the marginal effects shown in the last rows of Table 4. The
results show that manager involvement yields a higher sales ticket for all product usages.
The increase in sales generated by a team with managers relative to a no-manager team are
higher for the high usage intensity ($72.01 vs. $75.57), than they are for the products at the
median ($68.75 vs. $72.07) or low usage ($67.73 vs. $70.85). These differences across the
usage intensity are all statistically different (p < 0.01).
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Figure 2: Increases in Ticket Size with Teams of Managers by Usage Intensity

Once again, a graphical representation of these results aids the interpretation of the
findings. The increases in sales from teams with managers relative to no-manager teams
are shown in Figure 2. The increase in sales for customers whose vehicles with low usage
intensity are the lowest from all three (3.8%), followed by products with median usage
(4.0%), and products with high usage intensity having the highest sales difference (4.3%).
This result shows that manager involvement is more effective in increasing sales ticket size
for customers as product usage intensity increases, which does not fully support hypothesis
3. One potential explanation for this result is that low usage intensity vehicles require less
maintenance than the other levels of usage intensity, which would make the customers who
own them less susceptible to sales efforts. More research is needed to understand this
relationship.
Manager Involvement Effects on Store Sales
To test whether manager involvement has an effect at the store sales, we use the
model described by Equation 3. The estimations use machine learning techniques to take
advantage of the large size of the data, have a data driven exploration of the relationship
between the variables of interest, and to reduce the possibility of introducing our own
biases into the results.
A machine learning algorithm was designed to test a model with as many as ten
terms (a tenth-degree polynomial) while potentiating each and any of the terms by the
natural numbers up to the tenth power, trying all the permutations of these two criteria
(dimension and powers) on the same independent variable (StoreMI). The algorithm was
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programmed to minimizing the log-likelihood (LL) to select the best model fit, avoiding
bias in the selection of the polynomial degree and powers. The algorithm seeks for the best
model by testing model improvement using a likelihood ratio test (Greene 2012) on the
differences between the LL of the latest model and the LL of the previous one. The
algorithm stops when the improvement in model fit ceases to be statistically significant at
the 5% level. The model chosen by the algorithm is the last one that produced a
statistically significant improvement.
The results of the algorithm indicated that the best fit for the store sales data is
achieved with a polynomial of the fifth degree with three linear terms and a quintic term.
This means that the model that fits the daily stores sales data the best includes the manager
involvement variable (StoreMI) three times and the same variable to the fifth power.
Although the algorithm chooses the model with the best possible fit, a different model can
be chosen for other reasons such as parsimony using other fit measures such as the Akaike
information criteria (AIC) or the Bayesian information criteria (BIC). The next best model
fit was achieved by a model with a linear term and half a power. We chose to report the
results from this model instead of the best model because it has a better BIC and it is easier
to interpret5.

5

The results from the best model are available upon request. The interpretation of that model gives similar
results.
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Table 5: Polynomial regression of total daily sales

Variable
Manager Involvement
Linear
Half power
Store staffing
Season
Winter
Spring
Summer
Intercept

Total Daily Sales
259.13*
-663.57*

(26.30)
(22.02)

4.45

(22.65)

-98.66*
54.22*

(7.18)
(7.46)

209.55*
2233.66*

(8.18)
(19.08)

Sample size
156,833
Log-likelihood
-1,246,108
AIC
2,492,228
BIC
2,492,288
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% is denoted by *.
The model is fit using the daily store sales, thus the smaller sample size.

The output of the estimation of this model is shown in Table 5. The linear and nonlinear terms of manager involvement are all statistically significant. What the parameter
estimates mean is that manager involvement in transactions initially increases sales, then
changes direction and decreases, but at a slower rate than the initial increase. These results
are better demonstrated in graphical form (Figure 3). In the graph the initial growth in sales,
the inflection, and subsequent decrease can be easily seen. In practice, these results imply
that store sales increase as managers get involved in more transactions, up to a certain point
at which store sales reach their maximum level, and then decline as a higher percentage of
transactions have managers in them. These results support hypothesis 4, indicating that the
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relationship between manager involvement in sales transactions and the sales of the stores
follows a concave function.

Figure 3: Daily Store Sales and Daily Transactions with Managers
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CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Sales managers play an important role in sales organizations. The age-old question
on whether sales managers should be selling with their teams has a nuanced answer.
Managers supervisory role include recruiting, hiring, and monitoring performance. At the
same time managers can provide coaching, motivation, and guidance to teams when they
are selling with them. Without proper guidance from practitioners on when and how sales
managers should get involved with their teams and with the scarce literature on the selling
roles of managers, the present research seeks to provide some advice on this topic.
Managerial Implications
The practical implications of the findings are straightforward. Managers should be
involved in the sales of their teams, no doubt. Our results show that relative to a team with
no managers, the sales ticket is over 3% higher when a sales team has a manager. This
relationship between manager involvement and ticket size would suggest managers get
involved in as many transactions as they can, but it is not feasible or recommendable, to
have managers always involved in the sales process.
Managers add value when engaging in other tasks and as the scarce resource that
they should prioritize their time where it can produce the best outcome. To help firms
decide on the sales managers’ time allocation, firms can use customer type and product
usage intensity, external factors to the teams, as possible tools to help decide which
customers should get the manager treatment in order to maximize sales. By focusing on
onboarding of new customers and tending to customers with high usage intensity products,
managers are maximizing the effect of their presence on the sales team. Managers,
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however, should be cautious about not neglecting the supervisory duties as a result of
involvement in the sales, as that would prove detrimental to the performance of the store.
There is such a thing as “too much of a good thing” when it comes to sales managers
selling.
Contributions to the Literature
The current study contributes to the sales literature by providing one of the few
explorations of the selling role of managers. The existing literature mostly views managers
as an organizational aspect of sales teams (Heaphy and Dutton 2008) [see Table 1],
meaning that it focuses mostly on exploring the supervisory roles of managers. The gap in
this literature can be bridged by exploring the impact on the performance of teams of
having managers selling, not just supervising. Given the growing number of situations
where sales managers are called upon and have the opportunity to become part of their
teams, this research is timely.
Our research also contributes to the extant teams’ literature. In particular, the team
composition literature has not included managers as part of teams. For example, team
composition literature posits that heterogeneous teams exert more effort in contests than
homogeneous teams, impacting performance (Chen and Lim 2017). A team that includes
managers would be more heterogeneous than a team comprised of subordinates, so it is
important to examine this form of heterogeneity in team composition. Research on team
composition acknowledges that hierarchical structure and differences in hierarchy of team
members impacts performance, finding that a structure where more members have high
authority enhances team performance relative to a structure with the opposite distribution
of authority (Wellman et al. 2019). This research stream does not explore managers as part
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of those teams, although these clearly impact the hierarchical structure and are different in
their hierarchy to the rest of the team, presenting a potentially rich opportunity for
research.
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities
As with most scientific endeavors, this research has several limitations that can be
opportunities for future research. One limitation is that with the data used we are unable to
identify the mechanism that makes manager involvement have a positive effect on average
ticket size. In the setup of the firm where the data was gathered from, the customers cannot
obviously know if the team member is a manager or not. Observant customers might be
able infer the rank of their team, but there is not a way to be able to identify managers
unequivocally. As such, we cannot suggest that suspect that the effect on sales coming
from manager involvement is coming from customer perceptions of rank, but from the
customer reactions to effort. It would be interesting, however, to find out in a context
where managers are distinguishable from other team members, what are the effects of
manager involvement, something that could be explored in future research.
Given the setup of the industry, another limitation of this research and avenue for
future research is customer loyalty. The data does not allow for identification of the
likelihood of becoming a recurrent customer based on the first experience. The literature
suggests that a good first impression goes a long way in building customer loyalty. The
results suggest that new customers that have had a manager team would have a better first
impression based on their sales tickets. The question remains if that would make customers
more likely to return. Future research could test this idea and measure the long-term value
of manager involvement in the initial sale with new customers.
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As it is often the case with research using secondary data, there are aspects of the
interactions that cannot be identified from the data. The leadership styles of managers is
one example of an aspect of the team interactions that cannot be identified from the data
collected. Future research could look into how different leadership styles work with
manager concentration to impact sales. The competitiveness of the work environment also
cannot be observed from the data. The extant research on team composition has
documented the effects of competitiveness of the work environment on team cohesion and
performance. Future research could also test for these effects in the context of manager
involvement.
In this exploration of the transaction and store performance effects of having sales
managers be involved in their selling roles, we have been able to provide some guidance to
firms, uncover interesting relationships with customer and product characteristics, and
found that looking at a more holistic interpretation of the role of the sales manager is not
only a worthwhile endeavor, but a necessary one. It is our hope that more work will be
done to continue to help firms and scholars understand and assist the valuable resource that
sales managers are.
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